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Reading Mitsutoshi Takayanagi's paper (Takayanagi, 2010) makes me raise questions 
like these: 'What is education for, not only for students but also for teachers, who 
participate in an enterprise called "education?" '; 'Whatever it may be for, are we 
happy in teaching and learning?' As a matter of fact, happiness seems to be the last 
thing we have in mind in the school culture today where preoccupations with exams, 
grades, and entering to college are so widespread and pervasive in our educational 
consciousness both as teachers and as students. Even if we are concerned with 
happiness in relation to education, we tend to consider it to be something to be added 
. to our learning process, because it makes the leaning effective, not because it is 
essential to educational process or part of what makes learning be learning. But the 
latter account seems to be what Takayanagi pursues in his paper. As a way of 
responding to his paper, let me reconstruct Takayanagi's argument first. I will add my 
comments and questions along the way and raise a few questions at the end. 
The paper attempts to answer the question of what the relation between teachers' 
and students' happiness should be at the school. Here Takayanagi puts into question 
our common sensical idea that teachers' happiness should be sacrified for students' 
happiness at the school. In doing this, he seems to presuppose a concept of the proper 
connection between teachers' and students' happiness, even if he does not make an 
explicit suggestion about what sort of connection it would be. But what does 
Takayanagi mean by happiness? He defines the concept of 'happiness' in the 
utilitarian, especially Mill's utilitarian, sense, namely, 'happiness as pleasure' (or the 
satisfaction of one's desire). While wondering about the specific reason why he takes 
Mill's view, we can take it as a view of happiness we usually tend to understand in 
our everyday life. 
Then Takayanagi begins to argue against Mill's utilitarian moral principle, that is, 
'greatest happiness principle' (the greatest good for the greatest number of people) on 
the ground that it does not allow us a proper way of conceiving the relation between 
teachers' and students' happiness, or a proper way of 'avoiding conflicts' between 
them in Takayanagi's terms. According to him, it does not allow so, whether we 
interpret happiness in applying the utilitarian moral principle as 'lack of pain', 
'maximization of one's pleasure unless it harms others', or 'enjoyment of self-
sacrifice'. But the ground of his complaints against the utilitarian account sounds a bit 
weak when he claims that it cannot solve the conflicts between teachers' and students' 
happiness, as if his only concern in regard to the relation between teachers' and 
students' happiness were the removal or the relief of the conflicts between them. I 
think that if he criticized the utilitarian account on the educational ground, rather than 
on the political/moral ground, his argument would be stronger and more relevant to 
the concern he has in raising the question on happiness and education. 
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Now Takayanagi turns to Cavell's moral perfectionist interpretation of Mill's 
concept of 'higher pleasure' to find a better answer to the question he set up. Here 
Mill's statement 'happiness is desirable' is interpreted as saying that 'it is good to 
have happiness (as higher pleasure)', instead of saying that 'happiness (as higher 
pleasure) ought to be desired'. This means that happiness as higher pleasure is not a 
moral command, but a moral aspiration. And then, Cavell's interpretation of Mill's 
idea on 'individuality' from his work On Liberty against cultural conformity is 
introduced to conclude that the problem with unhappy controversy over teachers' 
happiness versus students' happiness lies in the fact that 'we (teachers) don't desire 
what we (they) truly desire'. In other words, we desire what others desire, so that we 
are deprived of (our own) true desire. This is suggested to us as a diagnosis of the 
whole problem, i. e., the confrontational common sensical understanding of the 
relation between teachers' and students happiness, and at the same time as a way of 
solving the problem. That is, as long as we know how to desire what we truly desire, 
the problem would disappear or at least be weakened. 
The rest of Takayanagi's discussion is now devoted to showing how this is the 
case. He gets into the discussion on Cavell's view of moral perfectionism, worrying 
about human voicelessness pervasive in our highly conformist culture. And the 
recovery of the voice is said to be the same as knowing how to desire what we truly 
desire. He also discusses how we can recover the voice in such a way as to become 
democratic members in the society, emphasizing questioning the condition in which 
one makes choices, and reengaging in the society with one's own desire, and so on. 
But the discussion here was a bit obscure and not fully developed. I think some of 
important terms of Cavell's, such as 'aversive thinking', 'closeness' and 'remoteness' 
should be further articulated to specify what it means to recover one's voice in the 
society. 
Finally, with his concluding remarks, we as readers are in a much better position 
to understand how Cavell's idea helps Takayanagi to answer the question he sets up in 
the beginning. Now, it can be said that teachers should learn how to despair (and then 
how to recover from the despair) to get out of this pervasive cultural conformity (of 
not desiring what they truly desire). Takayanagi calls teachers' 'despair' an 
educational emotion in the classroom. Teachers are expected to interact with their 
students in the classroom in search of their happiness, that is, their own voices as to 
what they truly desire, while examining and reconfirming the voices. This may be 
also a (educational) way of conversing with their students as to what the students truly 
desire, not in order for all of them to reach the same ideal, but for them to help each 
other questioning the condition of what each desires and making sense of the choice 
one makes and the kind of desire one desires in pursuit of one's own ideal about 
oneself. Takayanagi seems to assume that this conversation would slowly change the 
whole relation between teachers' and students' happiness in such a way as that one's 
pursuit of happiness tends to promote the other's rather than to compete against the 
other. I think this may be the very picture that Takayanagi's moral perfectionist 
conceives of as a proper relation between teachers' and students' happiness. 
Let me raise a few questions or comments, which I hope will be helpful to his 
further development of the argument., I will start with conceptual points. First, what 
sort of relation can Cavell's moral perfectionism exactly imply to us in regard to 
teachers' and students' happiness? By shifting his focus from 'pleasure (or happiness) 
in general' to 'higher pleasure (or higher happiness) in particular' in Mill's account, 
Cavell makes the question of happiness essential to education, but not in the 
utilitarian moral sense, but in the moral perfectionist sense. Happiness is a kind of 
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pleasure not as a maximum satisfaction of our desires but as a sensation from our 
inner fulfillment in pursuit of our self-ideal. We can see that in this picture teachers' 
moral obligation to promote students' happiness turns to their educational aspiration 
for moral perfectionists for themselves. We can also see that the role of teachers in 
relation to their students seems to shift from being a 'caretaker' to being a 'friend', at 
least in the sense that teachers and students are now expected to help each other to 
become better or happier persons. But, to make this paper educationally more 
interesting and stronger, what it means to be a better or happier person and what kind 
of friendship Cavell's moral perfectionism presupposes need to be further developed 
and articulated. 
Second, there seem to be two senses of 'the moral' that are addressed in this paper. 
I think they should be made conceptually distinct. When Takayanagi discusses a 
moral way of resolving the conflicts between teachers and students' happiness on the 
utilitarian ground in Section 2, it is 'moral' in the sense that we ought to do 
something as moral obligation in relation to others. We call this 'rule-governed' 
morality since what is a morally right thing to do is supposed to be justified on the 
basis of a certain principle. On the other hand, when Takayanagi discusses happiness 
as a moral aspiration in Section 3, it is 'moral' in the sense that questions like 'What 
kind of person I aspire to be?' or 'What kind of life I truly desire to lead?' are more 
relevant, as a question that is concerned with one's relation to oneself. Bernard 
Williams distinguishes these two concepts of morality in his book Ethics and The 
limit of Philosophy (Williams, 1985, p. 6) by calling the former 'the moral' and the 
latter 'the ethical' (He relates the latter more specifically to the Socratic question, 
'How should I live?'). If we accept this distinction of Williams, I wonder what the 
conceptual distinction between 'the ethical' and 'the educational' would be. And how 
would Cavell (or Takayanagi) respond to this question? 
There are some practical points I want to make as well. Takayanagi describes in 
the conclusion 'despair as a sign of teachers as learner'. If this is the case, our society 
is not short of teachers as learners, at least in the Korean context. We can easily 
encounter teachers in despair over their educational environments where genuine 
teaching-and-Iearning experiences always come secondary to all those exams imposed 
by the government in the name of education reform, as well as to constant ad-
ministrative demands on teachers for managerial convenience. Serious-minded 
teachers in Korea are in despair over their everyday teaching conditions; they 
complain that they would like to teach but they cannot. Most teachers often confess 
that they would be very happy if they were allowed to engage themselves in genuine 
teaching and learning activities with students. I think this is real despair. But is this a 
good sign? I think we as teacher-educators need to find a way of re-channeling this 
despair of teachers into good educational energy, rather than leaving them drained out 
of it. But, more often than not, their sheer despair in the face of the brutal reality of 
our educational environments makes the language of 'moral perfectionism' sound too 
weak or too remote to respond to it. Even I, as a professed advocate of moral 
perfectionism, cannot help asking myself, 'Is this the best thing we can offer to 
them?' But I don't think this self-doubt would work against moral perfectionism. 
Quite on the contrary! We teacher-educators may have to ask ourselves how to better 
address and frame the remote-sounding educational concern of moral perfectionism in 
such a way as to be deeply in touch with teachers in despair, surrounded by daunting 
challenges from their educational reality. 
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